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Collaborative management of the protected forests of Bangladesh 
 
Abstract: Participation in Bangladesh’s ‘protected’ forest management has been sought as a corrective 
to state’s failure to manage, conserve the country’s limited forest resources. ‘Participation’ is sought to 
achieve goals of conservation and livelihood. This is a significant shift from the radical pro-environment 
policy environment that locked forests away in ‘protected areas’, albeit largely ‘on paper’, from a 
significant human population whose interests are in conflict with those of the state, to a less radical 
ground where local inhabitants are ‘included’ in the ‘conservation’ of forest resources. While claims of 
successful ‘participation’ of local and non-local stakeholders in the newly imposed, ‘replicable’, 
management arrangements are surfacing, an understanding of the claimed participation becomes more 
relevant than ever. This essay argues that the claimed level and nature of ‘participation’ of the 
impoverished inhabitants of these protected forests is only a ‘construction’ that is gaining coin within the 
state – donor – development – academic landscape. The institutional arrangement put forward neither 
calls for meaningful participation nor take into account needs of a significant human population that is 
ever-increasingly dependent on the forest resources that are attempted to be ‘protected’.  
Keywords: co-management of forests, community forest management, forest devolution, 
participation, governance, natural resource management, CBNRM  
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Glossary of Acronyms 
 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
BNP  Bhawal National Park 
CHT  Chittagong Hill Tracts 
CWS  Chunati Wildlife Sanctuary 
MoE  Ministry of Environment 
DoF  Ministry of Finance 
FSP  Forestry Sector Project, ADB 
FD  Forest Department 
IPAC  Integrated Protected Area Co-management Project 
KNP  Kaptai National Park 
LNP  Lawachara National park 
MACH  Management of Aquatic Ecosystems through Community Husbandry 
NGO   Non-government Organization 
NSP   Nishorgo Support Project, USAID 
NP   Nishorgo Progam, Forest Department 
NFP   National Forest Policy (1994) 
NGOs   Non-Governmental Organizations 
NTFP   Non-Timber Forest Products 
PRA   Participatory Rural Appraisal 
PA   Protected Area 
PWS  Pablakhali Wildlife Sanctuary 
RKWS   Rema-Kalenga Wildlife Sanctuary 
RUG   Resource Users’ Group – village based groups resource users 
RMO  Resource Management Organization 
SNP   Satchari National Park 
TGR   Teknaf Game Reserves 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
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‘This much is clear: participation, a loose term to describe a wide variety of practices that aim for more 
inclusive development, does not automatically include those who were previously left out of such 
processes. It is only as inclusive as those who are driving the process choose it to be. - (Guijt & Shah, 
1998) 
The story of community participation in state owned forest management is relatively new in Bangladesh, 
as compared to similar developments in neighboring India, Nepal or elsewhere. The first attempts of such 
inclusion involved delegation of management responsibilities (i.e., developing, protecting and managing 
forests, plantations in and around ‘protected’ areas) to local individuals and user groups in exchange for 
minor subsistence extraction rights mostly limited to fuel-wood and other non-timber forest products 
collection and minor financial share of final timber sales. The ‘Social Forestry’ model included benefit 
sharing agreements (BSAs) through which productive forest generation, re-generation and management 
responsibilities and provisions for incentives in return have been established between participants and 
land owning agencies (e.g. the forest department or the Roads and Highways Department) (Muhammed, 
Koike, Sajjaduzzaman, & Sophanarith, 2005).  
 
More significant ‘partnerships’ have recently been formalized through the Nishorgo Support Projects and 
the follow up Integrated Protected Area Co-management program (IPAC, ongoing campaign to scale up 
structures introduced through the Nishorgo Support Project and MACH). Both of these, as well as the 
Forestry Sector Project (FSP), Sustainable Environment Management Program (SEMP), IUCN 
Bangladesh’s Initiative in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), donor driven management interventions have 
been seen by many, mainly development practitioners, donors and the state, as ‘successful’ attempts in 
including local users in forest conservation and forest management in general.  It is generally agreed that 
these interventions have had significant impact on mainstreaming ‘co-management’ to improved 
‘protection’ of the forest (International Resources Group, 2004). Attempts to ‘include’ local resource 
users forest management, e.g. MACH,  have partially succeeded in formalizing ‘inclusion’ of local 
‘participants’ in forest management. For example, ‘co-management’ institutions including members from 
civil society, local government, residents, resource user groups and the state have recently been 
recognized by the state (Co-management Council and Committee, resource management organizations, 
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forest user groups and federations, etcetera) (Bangladesh Gazette No. pabama/parisha 4/nishorgo-64/part-
4/112 dated August 10 20061). The ‘co-management’ institutions are ‘idealized’ to be responsible for 
overall management of the PA’s conservation, regeneration, patrolling responsibilities in exchange for 
financial benefits to those ‘actively’2 participating in carrying out these responsibilities. The formalization 
of the ‘co-management’ institution is seen by many as indicative of successful ‘participation’. The 
‘success’ of these initiatives have been translated as the opportunity to move from a project-based 
approach towards legally institutionalized popular participation, rather than selective inclusion of local 
resource users in overall management. As a result, the Integrated Protected Area Co-management project 
is currently scaling up ‘co-management’ institutions across the country. In an ideal world these 
developments have the potential to establish the necessary institutional infrastructure—empowered 
representative local authorities—for scaling up these popular-participation efforts in forests across the 
country. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Two models of local 'participation' in Forest Management in Bangladesh 
 
Improvements in reduced local dependence on forest products, forest protection and livelihood have been 
claimed by many. Khan et al. (2004) reviewed a number of early ‘social forestry’ project impacts and 
observed positive contributions of ‘participation’ to livelihood, governance and institutional capacity 
                                                          
1 downloadable at http://www.usaid.gov/bd/files/GovernmentOrderForNishorgoCoManagement.pdf  
2 Non-member forest dependents, inhabitants often do not receive any benefit, except for long-term benefits that 
may evolve from improved environmental services that are hoped to be achieved. Although there is provision for 
assistance grants to the extremely poor, they can hardly affect livelihood conditions.  
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building. Biswas & Choudhury (2007) claims successes of BSAs in conservation; he cites FAO data to 
report that the total forest area of Bangladesh has been increasing at a rate of 1.3% per year (FAO 2005 
cited in Biswas & Choudhury, 2007)3. Significant gains in forest regeneration and local incentive shares 
from the BSAs under the generic term ‘Social Forestry’ have been reported by Muhammed, Koike, 
Sajjaduzzaman, & Sophanarith (2005).  Khan et al (2008) in their study of the performance of the CMCs 
claimed significant improvements in livelihood, capacity development, conservation and community 
‘empowerment´. Shubhani  (2008), Shewli (2008) and Hoque (2008) also reports impressive results in 
women’s empowerment, livelihood and reduced subsistence extraction by local women. 
 
But it is always important to examine the broader institutional context of which such successes are part. 
Besides, a growing body of review literature provides ground for questioning the nature and scope of this 
participation.  First, any review of the processes that led to the inceptions of the ‘co-management’ 
intervention in Bangladesh’s PA management reveals that the local people were not involved in the 
planning, designing, implementation or evaluation of  this ‘co-management’ arrangements. Similarly, a 
brief glance at the two tier ‘co-management’ institutions reveals that ‘local participation’ is 
disproportionately limited and is clearly unable to influence decision making. Hossain et al (year 
unknown) analysed quantitative data to document lack of local participation and disproportionate 
influence and authority of the Forest Department in the Social Forestry Project. This lack of participation 
in decision making, implementation and evaluation has also been pointed at by Muhammed et al (2005) 
who also identify a lack of legitimacy and security of the rights assigned through various PBSAs. At a 
policy level, co-management suffers from an overarching issue of all-together non-recognition by existing 
laws, that have been read to forbid investment by anyone other than the government (such as 
communities, NGOs, and private groups) on reserve forest lands, including protected areas (International 
Resources Group, 2008; Hossain M. , 2008). 
 
These ramifications and overt ‘planner-centred’ nature of ‘token’ participation leaves one to question 
what agendas the current ‘co-management’ mainstreaming may potentially achieve and what impact they 
may have on the conservation, livelihood and governance of the forest areas of Bangladesh.    
Objectives of this study: 
                                                          
3 This data is in conflict with the same provided by Muhammed, Koike, & Haque(2008) and Muhammed et al (2005) 
who report that by 2002, forest resource cover had increased by only 1%, or about 0.14% year.  
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As an important common pool resource, forests are affected by various policy, processes and institutions 
that shape the sustainable use and management of forest resources to meet diverse goals (Ostrom, 1999; 
Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). In Bangladesh new institutions are being crafted to include and eventually 
‘empower’ local communities in forest ‘conservation’: an agenda increasingly put forward by donors and 
the state. It is anticipated that ‘local participation’ in management will effectively ‘protect’ the forests 
from the threats posed by the community, which they are members of, as well as external agents such as 
illegal loggers.  While no change in property rights from the state to the community has yet been 
proposed or meaningful ‘devolution’ with accompanying incentives has taken place, community 
participation is sought to enhance management efficiency. The introduction of the co-management 
institutions4 together with the policy changes have crucial bearings on management of forest resources 
and distribution of the benefits flowing, livelihood security of local resource users, communities as well 
as the future of developments around forest management in Bangladesh. The ongoing changes also 
challenge existing land right patterns and tenure security, affect existing power relations, informal 
institutions as well as creating conflicts over power and benefit distribution. 
  
An understanding of the perceptions and agendas of those driving the ongoing ‘scaling up’ of ‘co-
management’ efforts and contrasting these with the agendas and perceptions of the local resource users 
can inform what is to be expected of the ongoing ‘co-management’ efforts.  
 
Research Questions: 
It thus becomes important to make a number of enquiries relating to the ongoing ‘institutionalization’ of 
‘participation’ in Bangladesh’s forest resource management. This thesis has the following specific points 
of departure: 
 
Why is participation in Bangladesh’s forest management now conceived as an appropriate measure? 
Whose participation is sought through the ongoing structural changes relating to protected forest area 
management?  
What is the nature and extent of the participation sought? 
                                                          
4 The Nishorgo Co-management institution, currently being replicated through the IPAC projects bringing more 
forests into ‘co-management’, is a three-tier structure comprised of a Protected area conservation Council, Protected 
Area Conservation Co-management Committee and Forest User Groups (Chowdhury R. M., 2008) 
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Whose agenda does this participation serve? 
Does this ‘co-management’ involve adequate devolution of management authorities to equate with the 
responsibilities assigned? Or is this participation ‘empowering’ in the sense that local resource users and 
participants have sufficient control over management decision making, so as to effectively engage long 
term participation? 
What agendas do the local resource users have? 
What agendas do the actual ‘participants’ have? 
To address these questions, the thesis analyses the state-donor-NGO perspectives on participation in 
Bangladesh’s forest resource management. This understanding is then used to trace how these perceptions 
affect the institutional changes brought about to support participation. This also helps to analyse if any 
differences in the agendas of the state and donor may interfere with meaningful participation and 
sustainable governance of the forest resources in Bangladesh.  
 
Methods: 
This enquiry began with a policy/project document and literature review on the changes in forest 
management in Bangladesh and the impacts of the various ‘co-management’ arrangements thus far. 
Review of formal project documents, policy papers, legal documents informed the analysis of ‘who’s 
participation is sought, in what, who is participating and the nature and scope of actual ‘local’ 
participation and thus this assisted the shaping of the research questions and also played a useful role in 
confirming, contradicting and supplementing the findings claimed in various publications.  The secondary 
literature on the impact of such co-management institutions and reviews of actual participation or 
functioning of the institutions was built on to analyze the actual ‘translation’ of the project goals and to 
find answers to who is participating, why and in what; what this participation has meant for them, or if 
this participation will lead to improved conservation, livelihood or governance outcomes. The 
overarching concern was to map what the various ‘projects’ aimed to gain from the kind of ‘participation’ 
they sought and what the translation of the same into Co-management organizations e.g. co-management 
committees, councils, forest user groups, resource management organizations etcetera meant to the local 
participants and this was done by a Grounded Theory Analysis of the project documents and literature. 
Grounded Theory is a qualitative method used to systematically analyze large bodies of text, to construct 
theoretical models that are ‘‘grounded’’ in the text (Corbin and Strauss, 1990 cited in Reed, 2008). 
Outcomes in achieving the triple goals of conservation, livelihood gains and governance are reviewed 
from mainly secondary reviews, literature but also from project reports.  
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Background: 
Across the globe many recent policy initiatives in forestry recognize community participation in forest 
management, and natural resource management in general, as indispensable. An ‘estimated 22% of all 
forests in developing countries are now formally under some form of decentralized management’ (White 
& Martin, 2002 cited in Lund & Treue, 2008, p 2781). Nelson and Agrawal (p 557 – 558, 2008) 
attributes this change to “a result of multiple factors, including the growth of scholarship on common 
property and in political ecology during the past twenty years; the broader tenets of the neo-liberal 
orthodoxy of market-based incentives, property rights, and decentralization; donor interests in achieving 
synergies between rural development and biodiversity conservation; and the intersection between local 
demands for greater control over resources and political decision makers’ interests in reducing 
expenditures”. The justifications for seeking public participation include practical considerations such as 
cost effectiveness, management capacity etcetera as well as rather philosophical and development 
concerns involving social justice, governance, decentralization (Brown, Malla, Schreckenberg, & 
Springate-Baginski, 2002). Agrawal and Gupta (2005) summarize the ‘claimed effects’ of participation to 
include “greater access to decision makers, higher levels of participation by various social groups in 
decision making, and the accountability of decision makers”. This is particularly true in many developing 
countries in the south where the state has significant property rights over forests, forestry approach 
focuses on state production forestry or forest protection, and concerns for social issues and the interests of 
local communities are traditionally ignored. 
 
In many of these countries the most common modes of collaboration have been — transfer of control over 
forests, at varying degrees and differing modes, from the state to communities and sharing forest 
management roles amongst multiple stakeholders (Jane Carter, 2005). The ideal goal of the former is 
eventual complete devolution of forest management responsibility to local communities and this form of 
collaboration is usually sought where public management has sufficiently proven to be futile. The essence 
of the latter form of collaboration, on the other hand, is a partnership between local users, organized into 
smaller village scale forest management institutions and the state in which management responsibilities 
and benefits are shared on varying degrees while the state retains control over the partnership (Jane 
Carter, 2005).  
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Decentralization (meaning sharing of roles) and devolution (meaning transfer of control) are the two 
terms that have been used, rather confusingly, to refer to these different forms of collaboration between 
the state and the community in natural resource management5.   
 
In other parts of the world, both in the developing and the developed parts, collaborative or adaptive 
management has been significantly mainstreamed in multiple use forest management, mainly as a 
response to conflicts over uses and values – commercial, communal and conservation – but also as results 
of environmental activism and growing need for responsive governance. Whatever the driver of change in 
forest management has been, the essence of partnership, according to the rhetoric, is the recognition, 
albeit partial and evidently inadequate, that no one stakeholder can, or should, take full control of 
strategic and/or operational management. 
 
 
From Rhetoric to Reality: 
 
Disillusionment in participatory NRM management processes have led  many including Shackleton, 
Campbell, Wollenberg, & Edmunds (2002, p. 1) to conclude that most attempts to ‘include’ local 
participation reflect rhetoric more than substance. In an ideal world, participation in forest or NRM 
management in general is promoted with the triple objective of (i) forest conservation, (ii) improved rural 
livelihoods, and (iii) promotion of good governance. The actual realization of these goals however 
remains questionable (Cleaver, 1999; Lund & Treue, 2008; Brockington, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Often decentralization and devolution are used interchangeably to mean ‘redistribution of power, resources and 
administrative capacities through units of government and local groups’ (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001, p ). However, 
there is a key difference between the concepts: decentralisation is often used to denote transfer of administrative 
functions only while devolution is more often associated with transfer of power (meaning both the capacity and 
authority to contribute to decion making) ( Fisher, Durst, Enters, & Victor, 2000). To avoid confusion, this paper 
henceforth avoids the use of the word decentralisation, and uses the term devolution  to mean transfer of rights, 
power to local communities and people. There is a  more elaborate review of this concepts elsewhere in the thesis. 
Community Management 
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Figure 2: Framework to analyze devolution, forest management and livelihoods relationships, adapted 
from Tacconi (2007) 
 
 
The effect of ‘participation’ in forest conservation is ambiguous and poorly documented: 
 
There is growing evidence that participation in forest management can contribute significantly to rural 
livelihoods (Brown, Malla, Schreckenberg, & Springate-Baginski, 2002). The relation between poverty 
and environment, however, has proved rather elusive to be captured with accuracy. Theoretically the 
livelihood dependency, physical closeness to, local knowledge of and better information about the 
resource suggest that local communities are likely to be better and more efficient managers than 
centralized agencies (Lund & Treue, 2008). That local communities can manage and conserve natural 
resources autonomously has also been well documented in existing literature. However, the synergy 
between ‘participation’ and conservation is yet to be empirically explored (Reed, 2008;Lund & Treue, 
2008) although claims of improved environmental health achievements made from effective devolution 
are not too difficult to find (Schreckenberg & Luttrell, 200; Ribot 2004; Larson, 2003; Jane Carter, 2005; 
Gibson, Williams, & Ostrom, 2005; Meshack, Adhikari, Doggart, & Lovett, 2006). Larson (2003) finds it 
‘naïve’ to believe that local people will always opt for the conservation of forests or that their 
participation in and influence on local government will guarantee better forest use. He emphasizes that 
other factors such as economic incentives, the local incentive structure and an appropriate balance of 
powers with the central government, etcetera play an important role in achieving the desired benefits of 
devolution (Larson, 2003). Agrawal and Gibson (1999) and Enters & Anderson (2000) describe the 
weakness of earlier approaches to local engagement in that the assumption that relationships among 
community, livelihoods and natural resource as one of harmony, equilibrium or balance is fundamentally 
Services (health, 
education etc) 
Forest Livelihoods 
Indirect environmental 
Services 
Forest Use 
 
Forest 
Conversion 
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flawed and that local participation in NRM is often based on the following untested assumptions: local 
populations are interested and skilled in sustainable forest resource use and conservation; contemporary 
rural communities are homogeneous and stable; and local community-based tenurial, knowledge and 
management systems are uniquely suitable for forest conservation. 
 
 
 
‘Participation’ has meant little, if anything, for the poor: 
 
Although theoretically ‘participation’ has significant livelihood improvement and equity potentials 
(Ribot, 2002; Larson, 2003) practice has largely failed to live up to these expectations. Many efforts to 
incorporate ‘participation’ often tightened control of resource utilization resulting in more limited access 
to benefits, at least in the short term, as well as transaction costs to be borne by the poor (Ribot, 2004).  
 
Although partnerships in forest and natural resource management in general usually included 
restructuring the power relations between central state and communities through the transfer of 
management authority to local-level organizations, experience suggest that co-management has meant 
little for local resource users; in most cases only limited incentives to support state revenue or 
conservation interests rather than local livelihood needs (Shackleton, Campbell, Wollenberg, & Edmunds, 
2002). “To date, most public participation processes for many protected area management projects have 
been applied at the lower stages of consultative participation, which in Arnstein's (1969) terms, only 
serves the purpose of tokenism, merely paying lip service to the requirement of participation” - 
(International Resources Group, 2004, p 39). Nor has there been much evidence to support that 
devolution of forest management resulted in more increased efficiency, in terms of protection, livelihood 
or governance goals, than earlier conventional, exclusionary approaches brought about (Enters & 
Anderson, 2000; Cleaver, 1999; Lund & Treue, 2008). Enters and Anderson (2000) find this failure 
obvious since in most devolution efforts participation has been only lip service, where limited coercive 
participation has been achieved it often was limited to influential stakeholders with agendas conflicting to 
those of local resource users (Enters and Anderson, 2000). In particular, co-management largely failed in 
situations where the state and local people had ‘different expectations of what devolution was supposed to 
achieve and how’ (ibid).  More recently, many co-management efforts have been increasingly criticized 
for being vague promises without substance and occasionally for their overwhelming failures (Ribot, 
1999; Nelson & Agrawal, 2008) which in turn has threatened to withdraw support for devolution 
strategies before being ever implemented. Neumann (1997 cited in Nelson & Agrawal, 2008) went as far 
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as to suggest that many efforts to involve local people have only succeeded in reproducing earlier more 
coercive forms of conservation. This has led many to suggest that the blanket application of various 
participatory management approaches are ‘overly optimistic’ (Brown, Malla, Schreckenberg, & 
Springate-Baginski, 2002).  
 
This gap between the rhetoric and actual realization attests to the fact that there is an important 
distinction between real devolution of management and something merely called decentralization 
(Cleaver, 1999).  
 
In the absence of accountable, representative devolution entwined with active participation of the local 
resource users, and particularly the pro-poor, conservation, equity or governance are hardly achievable 
goals. Ribot et al observes that most efforts to involve participation are either flawed in their design, or 
encounter strong resistance from a variety of actors that erodes their effectiveness (Ribot, Agrawal, & 
Larson, 2006). Most, if not all, efforts that ‘pass as participatory forestry’ have managed to encourage 
participation as the lower levels of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder and rarely involved access to valuable forest 
resources (Fisher, 2000). Examples of decentralized forest management where meaningful powers are 
transferred to democratically elected and downwards accountable decision-making bodies are, in fact, rare 
(Arnold, 2001; Carter & Gronow, 2005; Ribot, Agrawal, & Larson, 2006; Shackelton, Campbell, 
Wollenberg, & Edmunds, 2002 cited in Lund & Treue, 2008).This observation is in line with Jane Carter 
(2005), Ribot (2002, 2006) and Shackleton, Campbell, Wollenberg, & Edmunds (2002) who maintain that 
reluctant and incomplete implementation of decentralized forest management is the primary impediment 
to success in a number of African countries. “This is because co-management processes, and the 
institutional arrangements that oversee their implementation, may easily be dominated by wealthier or 
more powerful members of the community, producing an outcome that perpetuates or even reinforces 
social inequities, including gender.” (Jane Carter, 2005; Schreckenberg & Luttrell, 2009; Glasmeier & 
Farrigan, 2005). Conversely, where meaningful devolution has taken place community management has 
succeeded, for example in Mexico communities successfully controlling as much as 80% of the forests 
and exploiting them commercially (Bray et al, 2003; Antinori and Bray, 2005 cited in Tacconi, 2007). 
Communities are also seen to be successfully managing large forest areas in Kumaon (India) and exploit 
them for non-commercial uses (Tacconi, 2007). 
 
Thus the problem with community conservation is not that it does not work, but that it has not been 
tried vigorously enough (Murphree 2000 cited in Brockington, 2007).  
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Although the success of community-based conservation has been limited it is reasonable to insist that 
communities and local government have not been sufficiently empowered to allow them to work properly 
and that adequate and proper devolution is the core of successful participation (Ribot, 1999; Brown, 
Malla, Schreckenberg, & Springate-Baginski, 2002). Brockington (2007) underlines similar observations 
on the centrality of adequate and proper devolution.  
When is participation perceived as empowering or meaningful? 
Contrary to what is often seen in practice, meaningful participation is dependent on high degree of 
accountability towards local needs and priorities, particularly those of the disadvantaged, the presence of 
mechanisms to prevent elite-captures and most importantly strengthening of local capacity (Shackleton, 
Campbell, Wollenberg, & Edmunds, 2002). Presumed benefits of devolution of NRM depend heavily on 
intensive participation of resource users which is also a fundamental goal of devolution (Agrawal & 
Gupta, 2005).The benefits of devolution policies are seen to improve with greater participation. 
Presumably, those that participate more in state efforts to devolve control over resources are also the ones 
that gain greater benefits from resources. Conversely, nonparticipating actors benefit less from devolution 
because they are unable to exercise their voice (Hirschman, 1970 cited in Agrawal et al 2005).  
In the same line community participation in itself is dependent on the existence of or the emergence of 
locally accountable and representative and duly empowered structures, institutions for decision making 
(Ribot, 1999). While acknowledging the potentials of participation when coupled with proportionate 
devolution Ribot (1999) makes two crucial observations about participation: first that in many contexts 
the instruments of enhancing participation do not constitute participation and second that where tokenism 
is achieved the participant rarely has any ‘power’ on decisions on forest management or the distribution 
of benefits flowing. He observes that “when local structures are representative few powers are devolved 
to them, and when local structures have powers they are not representative but rather centrally controlled. 
Rather than empowering or enabling, these policies control and administer the local, treating rural 
population as subjects to be managed and used. For these reasons, new laws and projects masquerading as 
political decentralization or community participation must be carefully analyzed” (Ribot, 1999: p 28 - 29) 
Devolution Vs Decentralisation: 
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Although often used interchangeably, the terms decentralization and devolution are quite distinct ideas. 
The subtle difference between the two is that decentralization often refers to relocation of administrative 
functions, as distinct from power, away from a central location.  Devolution, by contrast is the relocation 
of power, understood as the capacity to affect the outcome of decision-making processes (Fisher, 2000). It 
is important to stress that this implies a genuine role in decision making, not just a token input in the form 
of "consultation". By contrast devolution within branches of the central state is de-concentration - 
bringing government and its services closer to the population (Ribot, 1999). Devolution to 'community' 
and representative local government, the focus of our interest here, is also coined political decentralisation 
and can be a mechanism of community participation (ibid). Ribot (1999) envisages the achievement of a 
powerful form of community participation where locally accountable, representative, or even appointed, 
autonomy is created through right power devolution of real powers.  
 
Fisher (Fisher, 2000) identified three types of decentralization and devolution approaches prevalent in 
forest management. The first type is one of decentralization (of responsibilities without corresponding 
power); best exemplified in the JFM model in India, where real local user groups are ‘rewarded’ with 
limited benefits for the protection responsibilities they carry out. A slightly different variant of 
decentralization is common in many parts of Asia and the rest of the developing world, for example in the 
Philippines where major responsibilities as well as some power (as in limited devolution) are transferred 
to the local administration, as compared to a local community or organization. The final variant, arguably 
the most meaningful devolution, hands over a significant degree of control to local communities (for 
instance the model of community forestry in Nepal).  
 
Building on Ferguson and Chandrashekharan (2005), Thi extends the typology in line with the recipient 
of transfer by identifying four approaches that mark decentralisation in the Aisa-Pacific: from national to 
district government;  to village government; to communities by recognizing customary ownership of the 
communities; through privatization.” - (Thi, 2009). However, this typology does not make any reference 
to the degree and nature of decentralization. 
 
To result in effective participant engagement and improved environmental decision making, processes of 
participation must be supported by meaningful, if not complete, ‘devolution’. The benefits of participation 
are most likely to be achieved from devolution rather than any form of decentralization. 
 
Nonetheless, local participation in forest management is no longer limited to a few pilot projects and 
remote places, but it has found recognition in mainstream development (Sikor, 2006).  
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Governments around the world are in the process of devolving rights on forests to local people (Edmunds 
and Wollenberg, 2003 cited in Sikor, 2006). In Bangladesh, however, ‘co-management’ has assigned 
heavy responsibilities in combination with limited rights on the actual forest dependent participants. 
 
The theory of public engagement: typologies of Participation 
 
Typologies of Participation (taken from Reed, 2008) 
Basis of Typology Example 
Typology based on different degrees of 
participation on a continuum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Typology based on nature of participation 
according to the direction of communication flows 
 
 
Typology based on theory, distinguishing between 
normative and/or pragmatic participation 
 
Typology based on the objectives for which 
participation is used 
 
Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation: 
manipulation to citizen control; non-participation 
to Citizen Power.  
Davidson’s (1998) wheel of participation: 
Information – Consultation – Participation - 
Empowerment 
 
Rowe and Frewer (2000): communication - 
consultation – participation 
 
 
 
Michener (1998) 
 
  
Stakeholder participation has the potential to improve the quality of environmental decisions by 
embedding more comprehensive information inputs into decision making. A brief overview of the diverse 
range of typologies informs the interpretation of ideological, social, political and methodological 
meanings they are loaded with.  This overview will help linking our context with the appropriate 
typology, i.e. to categorize the participation that is taking place. 
 
The first mainstream categorization of stakeholder engagement was put forward by Arnstein  (1969) 
whose ‘ladder of participation’ described a continuum of increasing stakeholder involvement, from 
passive dissemination of information (manipulation), to active engagement (citizen control).  The ladder 
metaphor implies that higher rungs should be preferred over lower rungs. Davidson (1998) attempted to 
adapt the ladder to emphasize on legitimacy of different degrees of participation. His concept is that, with 
community involvement, a decision would be made as to which quadrant of the Wheel the project 
belonged. Then the appropriate strategy or strategies would be selected. The Wheel will only work 
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equitably as a model if this pivotal decision is taken collaboratively, failing this participation becomes 
‘information only’ projects.  
 
Rowe & Frewer (2000) emphasises on communication flows between parties. They categorise 
engagement into communication: information dissemination to passive recipients, consultation: gathering 
information from participants and participation: two-way communication between participants and those 
who engage participants. 
 
 
Reed (2008) also points at typologies that make distinction between participation that is normative and/or 
pragmatic. The key difference between the two is that normative participation is process oriented, 
recognizing participation as a democratic right and thus needs to be fair, representative, equalizes power 
between participants. Typologies relying on the pragmatic essence of participation, on the other hand, 
conceptualize key practical issues like ‘public acceptance’ versus ‘decision quality’ or ‘political’ versus 
‘technical’ participation (ibid).  
 
Michener (1998) made a further observation on ‘participatory’ processes that engage participation in 
meeting planner goals , hence the name ‘planner centered’, to the ends of early diffusion of an imposed 
change, local knowledge exploitation, shifting transaction costs to the participants and conflict avoidance. 
She then contrasts this with ‘people-centred’ participation, which is considered both a means and an end 
in itself. It is a means to meet local felt needs and redistribute scarce resources, but also has inherent value 
as a process which empowers the poor by enhancing local management capacity, increasing confidence in 
indigenous . 
 
     
Critical perspectives to policy making and implementation 
 
A critical anthropological perspective on how devolution policies are formed, interpreted and 
implemented is extremely relevant as a backdrop to any enquiry of agency and nature of local 
engagement (Thi, 2009). This perspective assumes that the ‘very tone of written policy documents 
adequately hint on whose knowledge or interests the policy serves’ and thus a critical perspective 
attempts to discover the hidden agendas by enquiring how concepts are formed and used, what 
implications the discourses and the language of the policy documents may have on the given context 
comprising of the norms and institutions, knowledge and power (Apthorpe & Gasper, 1996 cited in Thi, 
2009). Discourses in texts and outspoken statements can be analyzed in relation to context specific rules 
and institutions. Besides it may also shed light on the capacity, and thus empowerment levels, of the 
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participants engaged. As discussed earlier, devolution of authority to a participant who is not capable of 
influencing decisions is just useless; a critical perspective has the potential to show a capacity-mapping of 
the actors involved in devolution. While identifying policy as a rational but bureaucratic technology, 
critical anthropology criticizes “labels of participation or bottom-up approach of development projects in 
reality is a concealment of outsiders’ agencies” (Chambers, 1997; Chambers, 1983; Mosse 2005 cited in 
Thi 2009).  
 
 
 
Management of the state owned ‘protected forests’ in Bangladesh: taking a closer look at 
our context 
 
As in many parts of the world, the state owns and controls the brunt of Bangladesh’s forest that cover just 
over 17% of the country’s land coveri (statistical data from Chowdhury et al 2010).  Of the total 2.52 
million ha state owned forestlands, 243,723 million ha have been coined as ‘protected forests’ and are 
considered as spaces ‘set aside’ for ‘nature’ along the lines of parks systems in Europe or North America. 
As of today, there are 23 protected areas (national parks, wildlife sanctuary, game reserves)ii in 
Bangladesh (Arannyk Foundation, 2010). Covering almost approximately 1.65 % of the country’s total 
land area, the protected areas of Bangladesh cover 11% of the total forest area, an average of 5% of the 
hill forests, 11% of the Sal forests and 23% of the mangrove forests being protected (Chowdhury, Koike, 
& Muhammed, 2009; International Resources Group, 2004). 
 
Thus far, the state has been a poor manager of the country’s forests for various reasons — including 
having a traditionally corrupt and entrenched forest department as the custodian of the country’s forests; 
absence of an appropriate land-use policy, the low value of the forest resource compared to their high 
management costs; the lack of management capacity; and the de-facto open-access nature of national 
forest lands and illegal commercial extraction by local, political elites and crime syndicates (Biswas & 
Choudhury, 2007; Muhammed et al 2008; Quazi, Bushley, & Miles, 2008).With few exceptions, 
protected areas and reserved forests reside largely on paper, attesting more to the pro-conservation state-
donor alliance than to the presence of ‘‘actual’’ (i.e. well-managed) protected areas comparable to those 
found in the developed parts of the world. Consequently, forest degradation in Bangladesh is reported to 
be happening at a rate of 0.3% annually (FAO 2007). 
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Figure 3: Bangladesh's forest management: threats and desired outcomes 
The ‘co-management’ institutions are proposed in response to the possibility of the above lose – lose 
scenario which threatens both livelihood and forest health. Co-management is expected to engage local 
participation to compliment the forest department’s central role in management, by taking part in 
conservation in exchange for financial or minimal rights gains. The international donor, NGO sponsorship 
of almost all ‘participatory’ management efforts leaves little to doubt that ‘co-management’ was not 
locally conceptualized, instead it is donor driven. As the following discussion will show, however, the 
‘participatory’ edge of ‘co-management’ is at most a tertiary goal overarched by conservation demand.  
 
Protected Forest – Livelihood intersection: 
 
Recent research on decentralized forest management suggests that the tightened control of resource 
utilization is most costly to the poorest, who often also bear the lion’s share of management transactions 
costs (Lund & Treue, 2008). Most of the protected areas are embedded in human-dominated landscapes 
where the agendas of the poor are often in conflict with protection goals (Patwary, 2008). As such any 
‘inclusive’ participatory management approaches should be carefully compared to similar efforts 
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elsewhere that only meant tightened control of resource utilization leading to more limited access to 
benefits coupled with heavy transaction costs to be borne by the poor.  
 
As shown in charts 1 and 2 below, there is significant subsistence livelihood as well as economic 
dependence on the protected areas. Almost all rural appraisals, including Rapid Rural Appraisals and 
Participatory Rural Appraisals, done by the project planners identified subsistence dependence is a major 
cause of forest depletion. While chart 2 captures the relative extent of this dependence, field studies 
confirm that the local population accrues the following extractions from the PAs: fuelwood collection for 
household use and sale to local markets, agriculture, timber for use in habitat construction or repair, 
timber for sale to external illegal loggers, bamboo, Cane collection for household use, to meet energy 
needs, fodder gathering, hunting, betel leaf cultivation, honey, vegetable, medicinal plants collection. 
 
Chart 1: highlights population density in several 'co-managed' forests 
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Chart 2: shows the degree of subsistence dependence on 7 ‘co-managed’ forests (by % of total 
inhabitants in those forests) 
 
 
Chart 3: compares the average income of forest dependents in 5 PAs with national income (in 
Bangladesh Taka) (International Resources Group (IRG), 2008) 
To take for example, one of the protected areas The Teknaf Game Reserve spreads over an area of 11615 
Ha and is home to 113 human settlements (an estimated 119950 inhabitants) that have complete (70 
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settlements) to minor (7 settlements) dependence on the forest (Nishorgo Support Project, 2004). Karim 
(2008) provides slightly different figures of local inhabitants depending on the same forest; he finds that a 
total of 115 villages  with the population of 149564 are located within, on the periphery or adjacent to the 
forest. He finds that 62% of the population have major stakes while 32% have moderate stakes in the 
forest. 
 (Nishorgo Support Project, 2004) 
This intense subsistence dependence has at least two implications for conservation; first,exclusionary or 
cocercive protection is difficult to achieve or altogether impossible to attain without local participation 
Second, any ‘labeled’ participatory process will soon be subject to a variety of conflicting interests 
intersecting the volatile agenda of conservation; while any ‘inclusive’ management regime should at the 
very least take these conflicts into account to inform what can or should be achieved and whose interests 
are marginalised and thus needs to be protected . 
 
Conceptualising possible outcomes of PFA management: 
 
Sunderlin et al (2005) proposed a simplistic but useful fourfold typology for achieving a clear conceptual 
grasp of various positive and negative outcomes, and the reasons for them, as described in figure 4 below. 
The typology can be used to capture the management outcome being sought in Bangladesh.  
Although a win-win scenario is often seen as a strong possibility, such a scenario may well be a long-term 
rather than short term goal. 
 
Win- win 
• Extraction, endogenous subsistence dependence and 
exogenous product extractions, significantly reduced 
• Local engagement in regeneration and more improved 
management 
• Livelihood options diversified, given the market-economic 
growth linkages and overwhelming funding requirements 
this may not prove viable, thus migration or other un-
equitable coercive conservation rule-abidance may be 
desired 
• non-local extraction is halted, i.e. illegal organized felling 
Win – Lose 
• A high value of forest products and services provide 
significant short-term opportunities, such as cash-ins or 
economic growth  
• Extraction outweighs forest delivery capacity 
 
• In many protected areas, resources have been depleted to 
the extent that sedentary agriculture is neither a viable 
livelihood option; resource scarcity has led to decline in 
extraction in TGR, CWS. This may indicate that a win – 
lose is improbable in the short term. 
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• local extraction is within the limits of regeneration  
Lose – Win 
 
• Forest dependents coercively restricted from extraction and 
engaged into regeneration and protection 
 
• Forest dependents migrate 
 
 
Lose – Lose 
 
• Forests are depleted by subsistence as well as outsider 
extraction 
• Environmental services cease to flow, no cashing in of 
forest products is possible 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Fourfold classification model of human well-being and forest cover (Sunderlin, et al., 
2005)  
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The ‘co-management’ institutions: 
 
The ‘Co-management’ model in Bangladesh was developed by the 
USAID6 and the Department for Forests and Environment and the first 
Councils and Committees were formally formed in 2006. 
 
 A two-tier institutional structure of Nishorgo Support Project (2003) 
includes Co-management Council and Co-Management Committee. 
The Co-Management Committee (CMC) consists of around 19 Council 
elected 19 members is responsible for overall management of the 
protected area. The Council consists of 50 members, selected by the 
FD, NSP, IPAC, and the project consultants with ‘consultation’ with 
the poor, the mode or effect of which is not known. The Committee is 
responsible for forest management planning and, upon approval of the 
Council or the FD, Projects, execution of those plans with the support 
of FD and the project (NSP, IPAC have contractors International 
Resources Group, CODEC, NACOM, RDRS and more).  
 
An organization of the Council and Committee members as wells as 
their duties are presented in Box 1 as an endnote, from (Chowdhury, 
Koike, & Muhammed, 2009). iii An influence map of the Council 
members, presented in figure 4 and an administrative hierarchy 
presented in Figure 3, attempts to capture the extent of ‘local 
participation’.  
                                                          
6 Through the Nishorgo Support Project made up of International Resources Group (IRG), Community Development 
Centre (CODEC), Nature and Conservation Movement (NACOM) and Rangpur Dinajpur Rural Services (RDRS)  
Nishorgo Support Project (2003) has the 
following six specific objectives:  
1. Develop a functional model for 
formalized co-management of PAs.  
2. Create alternative income 
generation opportunities for key 
local stakeholders associated with 
pilot co-managed PAs. 
3. Develop policies conducive to 
improved PA management and build 
constituencies to achieve these 
policy goals. 
4. Strengthen the institutional 
systems and capacity of the Forest 
Department and key stakeholders so 
that improvements in co-
management under the Project can 
be made permanent. 
5. Build or reinforce the 
infrastructure within Protected Areas 
that will enable better management 
and provision of visitor services at 
co-managed sites. 
6. Design and implement a program 
of habitat management and 
restoration for pilot Protected Areas. 
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Figure 2 Management/Administrative Hierarchy of the current 'co-management' structure 
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Figure 4: an organizational structure of the formalized Co-management 
Council shows influence mapping as well as representation size 
 
 
 
Co-management Council 
 
24 State, FD 3 non-state External 
1 UNO, the Chair 
1 ACF 
1 FD rep 
13 local government reps, 
including 1 female 
1 Member of 
Parliament 
9 Forest User group reps 
6-8 local elite 
representatives 
6 resource 
owning group 
reps 
1 Law 
enforcement  
3 Ethnic Minority 
reps 
2 local youth 
2 local NGO reps 
1 major 
stakeholder group 
 
6 misc govt 
institutional rep 
26 – 28 Insiders 
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Whose agendas does ‘co-management’ serve? 
 
In an earlier section we briefly touched upon critical anthropological perspectives that deploy analysis of 
texts, documents, overt claims to discern the hidden agendas of policy makers, who often are outsiders 
and have the capacity and agenda to suppress those of the poor and marginalized. Although the enquiry of 
this section is more easily answered by looking at who sponsors this ‘co-management’ a critical 
anthropological analysis of ‘co-management’ institution building in Bangladesh literature proves to be no 
less revealing. 
 
 
 
Is local user ‘participation’ in the Protected Forest Management more of a construction 
than a reality? 
 
The process of a robust, representative and forward looking institution building would begin with 
identifying those affected by or are able to affect forest governance and then prioritizing these individuals 
and groups for involvement in the decision-making process (Reed, 2008). This means then that 
stakeholder participation should be considered right from the outset, from concept development and 
planning, through implementation, to monitoring and evaluation of outcomes. Engagement with 
stakeholders as early as possible in decision-making has been frequently cited as essential if participatory 
processes are to lead to high quality and durable decisions (ibid).  
 
Chowdhury R. M., (2008) observes that ‘co-management’ was not an outcome of local participation. In 
contrast to explicit claims of ‘participation’ the new sturctures were in reality conceptualised, 
implemented and now being mainstreamed by a donor supported state (Hossain M. , 2008). Patwary 
(2008) studied stakeholder perceptions of local engagement at various levels of management decision 
making in CWS; and he quotes Uphoff (1992 cited in Patwary, 2008, p 132) to report findings similar to 
Chowdhury and Hossain (2008): “The problem of biodiversity loss was raised by international and 
national conservationists and biologists and decisions regarding what, where and how to conserve 
biodiversity were made by external scientists with no participation, consulation or input from local 
inhabitants, despite the fact that the local residents have the largest stake in, and much information about, 
natural resources in the area”. 
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Similarly, the top tier of the institution shown in Figure 3 below, co-management councils are formed and 
their members are chosen by the state with consultation of the project planners and participating NGOs 
(Chowdhury R. M., 2008). While the selection of a wide array of local non-local actors indicates an 
attempt of confrontation-avoidance and concensus building, the basis for this formation remains 
essentially in contrast to the ‘participation’ outcome the policy papers purport to achieve.  
 
The top tier of the co-management hierarchy, the Councils are formed and council members are ‘selected’ 
by the state on recommendation from external agencies e.g. NSP, IPAC, NACOM, IRG, etcetera, who 
only hints at consultation with various stakeholders. Although how this consultation was carried out, who 
took part, what their ‘participation’ meant to the process or the final structure, is unknown since no 
available literature, project document refers to this process. Consequently, Patwary (2008), Chowdhury, 
and Quazi et al (2008) report absence of participation and accountability in the ‘co-management’ 
institutions. 
 
Figure 3: participant perceptions of participation in different stages of management of the CWS 
(Patwary, 2008)7 
 
“Co-management processes, and the institutional arrangements that oversee their implementation, may 
easily be dominated by wealthier or more powerful members of the community, producing an outcome 
                                                          
7 Patwary (2008) relied on quantitative interviews of 10 participants (3 Co-management Committee members, 3 
Co-management Council members and 4 community patrolling group members) and 20 non-participating local 
resource users. Although his interviews document participant perceptions of their engagement, Patwary does not 
explain how, for example, non-participating members may possibly have ‘participated’ when there is no place for 
such participation in the co-management arrangements. 
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that perpetuates or even reinforces social, including gender inequities “ - (Jane Carter, 2005) . In the ‘co-
management’ structures in Bangladesh this may already be the case. The second tier of the structure, Co-
management Committees are elected by the Council and often they are selcted on the basis of influence 
and affinity with NSP. Chowdhury (2008) interviewed co-management committee members in LNP who 
confirmed that they were the local elites; they revealed that the basis for their selection as committee 
members was their awareness of the scenerio in LNP and their early and close involvements with NSP. 
Hossain thus juxtaposes claims of equity and governance achievements with the reality of ‘re-production’ 
of elite capture. Thus because committee members are either elites of the society, members of the local 
government or political parties they seldom represent the community or the poor (Chowdhury, 2008; 
Patwary, 2008).  
 
Further the only forums of the local resource users, FUGs and CPGs or the occasional community 
meetings with participating NGOs, planners, committee members, can only be seen as information 
gathering sessions.  
 
Thus Hossain and Choudhury (2008) observe that with only minimal devolution of responsibilities and 
bare local representation, the current structures of co-management committees and councils are no more 
than replications of earlier structures dominated by outsiders, forest department and by elites with 
political dominance.  
 
This confirms a general theme in the literature, policy documents that overall popular participation in 
natural resource management in Bangladesh is appreciated only as ‘complimentary’ to forest 
department’s leading role in forest management. This is evidenced in the organization of the NSP 
institutions, particularly in the Community Management Councils and Committees and also in the 
literature; for example in Khan, Dutta, Ahsan, Mrong, Sultana, & Rahman, 2008; Chowdhury R. M., ( 
2008).  
 
A lip-service may be difficult to differentiate from consultation or active engagement where the 
participants are theoretically ‘devolved’ the power but lack the ability to engage, for example due to 
perceived or real power imbalances, or from a lack of confidence in engaging. Thus only providing 
stakeholders with the opportunity to participate in decision-making may not preclude their ability to 
influence decisions; they must actually be able to participate (Reed, 2008; Larson, 2003). Khan et al 
30 
 
(2008) provides a representative description of the expectations the state, donor and experts currently 
have about resource user ‘empowerment’. To them ‘empowerment’ in the context would constitute of 
capacities in ‘communicating, organization, accessing resources, and voicing on issues of equity, 
advocating needs at the community and policy levels and evaluation. 
 
‘The prevalence of patron-client relationship between elite individuals/families at different administrative 
levels and between local elites and poorer members of society dependent on them for land or work or 
access to state resources that they control or distribute’ is seen as a barrier to the participation of the poor 
in our context (The WorldFish Centre, 2009, p. 28). Those living in the protected areas are often illiterate, 
lack confidence in taking part since only the local government members, the project staff, FD, outside 
experts; academicians are the ones who traditionally ‘owned’ decisions (Patwary, 2008).   
 
What implications does ‘co-management’ have on the poor?  
 
Decentralized forest management may improve access to economic benefits through consumption and 
trading of forest products, hence, promoting improved rural livelihoods (Larson, 2005). In the protected 
areas of Bangladesh forests are of immense value to a significant number people, most of who are 
extremely poor. Decosse (2006 cited in Chowdhury, Koike, & Muhammed, 2009) estimated a population 
of over a quarter of a million at the 5 NSP sites, 90% of which he considered to be poor or ultra-poor. 
Any management decision must take this dependence in account, not just because there is poverty 
reduction agenda but also because excluding these people from the ‘protected forests’ or reducing their 
dependence on the forests is a nearly impossible goal to achieve. Declaring forests as ‘protected’ and 
making extraction illegal has failed to deliver. 
 
‘Co-management’ has however placed increased protection responsibilities on the local resource users.  
Forest patrolling groups are policing against both illegal timber product extraction as well as local 
extractions. Participating in externally organized tree felling used to be a source of income to many local 
poor; this however is largely reduced from the FPG and other local enforcement.  Similarly, income from 
fuel wood collection and their sale to markets is also no longer a livelihood option, at least without 
confronting FUG or FPG opposition. This only means that ‘co-management’ is proving costly to the poor.  
 
Planned AIGAs, small funds, grants to public services, re-channeling of the ‘co-management’ 
institution’s share of forest revenue are also failing to adequately compensate for the trade-offs. The 
AIGAs are offered to diversify livelihood from forest extraction to the following options cow fattening 
31 
 
both for beef and milk, poultry rearing, nursery production, improved stoves manufacture, nature tourism 
and eco-lodge, eco-guiding, service enterprises in PAs, elephant rides as tourist amusement, tribal cloths 
manufacture, date palm leaf based cottage industry, social forestry in buffer zone for poles/logs, fuel 
wood and medicinal plants cultivation, direct payments for conservation, access to capital such as NGO 
microfinance, CMC-led microfinance, linkages to existing Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) and 
matching grants (DeCosse 2006).  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
To quote the Forest Department (2007, p 23), ‘co-management’ ‘is designed to assist in achievement of 
the primary objective of conservation of biodiversity within the Protected Forest Areas (PFA). This 
overall objective is to be achieved through support to the Forest Department and to key local and national 
stakeholders using a collaborative approach to the management of the PA’. Local resource user or 
resource dependent participation is evidently conceived as ‘supportive’ to FD’s mandate. The 
insignificant representation of the local people and the minimal ‘power’ devolved on all levels of the 
institution means that almost all decisions are state owned.  
 
If ‘participation’ in forest management does not cover the costs imposed on the poor, if AIGAs fail to 
deliver the promised livelihood diversification, the effectiveness of ‘participation’ may eventually be 
questioned. In Bangladesh, evidence suggests that poor locals may only receive, if anything, derivative 
possibilities of benefitting from ‘Co-management’ of PAs (Karim, 2008). While insufficient AIGAs and 
evidently small direct grants are made available to selective ‘participating’ members, their flow cannot be 
continued without unrealistically heavy external funding that needs to be carefully protected from elite-
capture.  
 
Transforming state institutions, from agencies that enforce, regulate, control and restrict to ones that 
facilitate, support, decentralize and disengage is at the very least a long-term goal. Current ‘co-
management’ institutions and processes are fraught with a sheer lack of devolution. In the first place, they 
do not adequately represent or account to local resource dependents or own decision making. Secondly, 
they are only sidelined to the forest department and the ‘project’ while their legitimacy is still to find 
place in the legal system. The possibility that an adequately empowered ‘co-management’ institution 
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Livelihood-Governance Issues: 
The local resource users are not adequately 
represented in the institutions, their limited 
representation is mostly limited to through local 
government and elites, with whom the poor have a 
‘client-patronage’ relationship. Thus livelihood 
needs may not be accounted for and where 
‘heard’ can easily be overridden.  
Decisions on revenue utilization or investments on 
public services are ‘owned’ by the FD. This 
severely weakens ‘co-management’ institutions. 
 
would become sources rather than sinks of public or donor fund and thereby enhance governance and 
equity is a distant goal.  
Conservation remains a task to be carried out by a ‘technically’ empowered Forest Department whose 
capacity building is a major agenda of the donor-state coalition. While agreements between forest user 
groups and the co-management committee are put forward to enhance re-generation, their security is 
questionable.  
  
 
 
Livelihood-Conservation Issues:  
AIGs, grants to community services, small financial grants to 
support the poorest are proving to be insufficient to 
compensate for the reduced extraction required to achieve 
‘conservation’ 
Even when adequate incentives can be externally injected, 
can ‘conservation’ goals be reached without community 
mobilization? 
The ‘co-management’ structures make a distinction between 
‘participating’ and non-participating members.  
Conservation-Governance Issues: 
FD, the state and the donor led planners remain 
the ‘owners’ of ‘co-management’. This leads to 
decision efficiency where approvals are time-
consuming, which in turn results in distrust in 
the institution  
The ‘co-management’ institutions are not 
devolved with adequate authority, have been 
elite ‘captured’, does not adequately ‘include’ 
the poor.  
FD and the ‘co-management’ institutions are 
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i Total Forestlands of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Forest Department, 2008 cited in Chowdhury et al 2010) 
Category  Area (million ha) Percentage of total land 
Forest Department managed 
forests (1.52 million ha, 10.3% 
of total land) 
Hill Forests 0.67 4.54 
Natural mangrove Forests 0.60 4.07 
Mangrove plantation 0.13 0.88 
Plain Land Sal Forests 0.12 0.81 
Unclassified State Forests 0.73 4.95 
Village Forests 0.27 1.83 
Grand Total 2.52 17.08 
 
ii Table: Protected areas of Bangladesh (Chowdhury & Koike, 2010) 
Protected Area Forest Type Area (ha) Established (Extended) 
Modhupur National Park Sal Forest 8436 1962 (1982) 
Bhawal National Park Sal Forest 5022 1974 (1982) 
Himchari National Park Hill Forest 1729 1980 
Lawachara National Park Hill Forest  1250 1996 
Kaptai National Park Hill Forest 5464 1999 
Ramsagar National Park Sal Forest 27.75 2001 
Nijuhm Dweep National Park Coastal Mangrove 16352.23 2001 
Medha Kachapia National 
Park 
Hill forest 395.92 2004 
Satchari National Park Hill Forest 242.82 2005 
Khadimnagar NP Hill Forest 679 2006 
Sundarban (East) WS Natural Mangrove 31226.94 1960 (1996) 
Pablakhali WS Hill Forest 42087 1962 (1983) 
Char Kukri Mukri WS Coastal Mangrove 40 1981 
Chunati WS Hill Forest 7761 1986 
Rema-Kalenga WS Hill Forest 1795.54 1996 
Sundarban (South) WS Natural Mangrove 36970.45 1996 
Sundarban (West) WS Natural Mangrove 71502.13 1996 
Fashiakhali WS Hill Forest 1302 2007 
Hajarikhil WS (Proposed) Hill Forest 2908  
Teknaf GR Hill Forest 11615 1983 
Sita-Kunda EP Hill Forest 808 1998 
Madhu-Tila EP Sal Forest 100 1999 
Madhob-Kunda EP Hill Forest 266 2001 
Banskhali EP Hill Forest 1200 2003 
Kua-Kata EP Coastal Mangrove 5661 2006 
Dulahazara SP Hill Forest 900 1999 
 
iii Box – 1: Structure of Co-management Council and Co-management Committee (Government of 
Bangladesh 2006 cited in Chowdhury, Koike, & Muhammed, 2009) 
 
Co-management Council: 
 
• Member of the Parliament as advisor 
• Upazila Nirbahi (Executive) Officer (UNO) as Chairperson 
• Assistant Conservator of Forest (ACF) as Member Secretary- 1 
• Representative from the Forest Department (FD)- 1 
• Representative from local government- 13 (1 being woman) 
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• Representative from resource user groups (poor stakeholders)- 9 
• Representative from local elites (teacher, physician, social worker, newsman, religious leader, freedom fighter)- 6-8 
• Representative from resource owning groups (owners of brickfields, sawmills, wood & furniture businessmen)- 6 
• Representative from ethnic minority group- 3 
• Representative from law enforcing agencies (police, BDR, Ansar & VDP)- 1 
• Representative from local youth groups-2 
• Representative local NGOs- 2-4 
• Representative from major stakeholder groups (e.g., tea estate where ever applicable)- 1 
• Representative from other government institutions- 4-6 
 
The total number of members in the council shall be not more than 55, and at least 10 of the members shall be women. The 
members will be elected for 4 years and new council will be formed every 4 years through Annual General Meeting. 
 
Co-management Committee: 
 
• Upazila Nirbahi (Executive) Officer (UNO) as advisor 
• Assistant Conservator of Forest (ACF) as Member Secretary- 1 
• Representative from the FD- 1 
• Representative from local Government (one being woman) - 3-4 
• Representative from civil society - 2-3 
• Representative from resource user groups – 2 
• Representative from local youth groups – 1 
• Representative from resource owning groups – 2 
• Representative from ethnic minority groups – 2 
• Representative from law enforcing agencies – 1 
• Representative from other government institutions – 2 
• Representative from NGOs – 1 
 
The total number of members in the committee shall be between 15 and 19. The committee will be formed amongst the members 
of Co-management Council and will be elected by the respective groups of the Council for 2 years. 
 
Job responsibilities of Co-management Council and Committee: 
 
Co-management Council: 
 
1. Convening an annual general meeting and at least one additional meeting 
2. Providing pertinent suggestions to the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) on any modification, addition or correction after 
reviewing the annual work-plan of the PA 
3. Taking collective decisions on activities that have adverse effect on areas in and around PA 
4. Providing required guidance to the Co-management Committee (CMC) on PA management 
5. Developing policies for distribution of goods and services gained from PA among the stakeholders and also oversee such 
distribution among them by the CMC 
6. Providing required approval to the PA Annual Work Plan developed by the CMC 
7. Playing effective role in quelling any conflict that arises among the members of the CMC 
 
Co-management Committee: 
 
1. CMC will act as executive body of the Council and will be accountable to the Council for all their activities 
2. Liaising with FD officials responsible for management of the PA on local stakeholders’ participation; 
3. Distributing the proceeds from goods and services from the PA among the groups or teams linked with management activities 
according to the guideline developed by the Council 
4. Supporting FD in employing labor from groups/teams linked with PA management in development activities undertaken by 
NSP 
5. Developing and submitting project proposals requesting funds for development of the PA and landscape zone 
6. Developing work plan for expenditure of fund collected locally through PA management and ensuring spending upon approval 
from respective DFO 
7. Maintaining proper accounts of all local collection and expenditure from PA management. 
8. Taking required steps, upon approval from the DFO, to initiate patrols for maintenance of PA resources 
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9. Playing supportive role in containing any conflict arising between local stakeholders and FD or any other 
government/nongovernment organizations. 
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